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Abstract
Ambient Intelligence aims to offer personalized services and easier ways of in-
teraction between people and systems. Since several users and systems may
coexist in these environments, it is quite possible that entities with opposing
preferences need to cooperate to reach their respective goals. Automated ne-
gotiation is pointed as one of the mechanisms that may provide a solution to
this kind of problems. In this article, a multi-issue bilateral bargaining model
for Ambient Intelligence domains is presented where it is assumed that agents
have computational bounded resources and do not know their opponents’ pref-
erences. The main goal of this work is to provide negotiation models that obtain
efficient agreements while maintaining the computational cost low. A niching
genetic algorithm is used before the negotiation process to sample one’s own
utility function (self-sampling). During the negotiation process, genetic oper-
ators are applied over the opponent’s and one’s own offers in order to sample
new offers that are interesting for both parties. Results show that the proposed
model is capable of outperforming similarity heuristics which only sample before
the negotiation process and of obtaining similar results to similarity heuristics
which have access to all of the possible offers.
Keywords: Automated Negotiation, Bilateral Bargaining, Agreement
Technologies, Evolutionary Computation, Multi-agent Systems
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the number of computational devices present in our everyday life
has grown considerably. The use of technology looks to help us achieve a better
quality of life, to make our life easier and more comfortable. However, due
to the increasing number of devices, it is necessary that the technology itself
adapts to the needs of the user, instead of the human being the one that adapts
to technology. In that sense, Ambient Intelligence (AmI) tries to cover that
necessity: it looks to offer personalized services and provide users with easier
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and more efficient ways to communicate and interact with other people and
systems [4, 35].
Agent technology has been appointed as a proper technology for the support
of AmI solutions [4, 10, 31]. In fact, agents show interesting characteristics for
AmI environments since they are reactive, proactive and social [36]. Firstly,
reactiveness allows agents to change their behavior according to some new con-
ditions in the AmI environment (new users, new services, etc.). Secondly, proac-
tiveness makes it possible for agents to act autonomously according to the user’s
goals, which results in a smooth and non-intrusive interaction with the AmI user.
And lastly, the agent’s social behavior allows several heterogeneous entities to
cooperate and offer new complex services to the AmI user.
Over the last few years, researchers in the area of agent technology have
shown a growing interest in automated negotiation. Negotiation can be defined
as a process in which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties
first verbalize contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a
process of concession-making or search for new alternatives [29]. Therefore, au-
tomated negotiation consists in such a joint decision being automatically decided
by means of autonomous entities (e.g., agents representing different users). The
parties participating in a negotiation process have opposing preferences, thus
negotiation can be considered as a conflict resolution mechanism.
Such conflict circumstances are not alien to AmI applications. For instance,
shopping malls may be converted into ubiquitous environments where several
vendors offer their products to passing shoppers [16, 2]. In many cases, the
shoppers know what they want but do not have time to check every shop that
offers such products. A possible way of enhancing the customer experience is to
automatically negotiate with all of the vendors. A list with the best agreements
may be presented to the user through his mobile device. This way, the user does
not have to check every possible shop since his mobile device has negotiated with
every shop taking into account the user preferences. Nevertheless, there are
also benefits for the vendors since automated negotiation allows a more flexible
commerce than classic e-commerce. For instance, they may negotiate issues such
as price, payment method, discounts, and dispatch dates, which is what often
happens in traditional non-electronic commerce. Flexibility in e-commerce may
result in client loyalty since the vendor is able to adapt as much as possible to
the client preferences. Therefore, automated negotiation is a proper technology
for e-commerce-based AmI applications such as shopping malls.
The process of negotiation has been traditionally studied by the field of Game
Theory [26, 34], providing solutions that reach optimal results under different
criteria (e.g., Pareto efficiency, Nash Product, etc.). However, such solutions
require unbounded computational resources that are not available in most real
applications. In such cases, the research area of artificial intelligence (AI) has
tried to provide a solution by means of heuristics that achieve results that are
as close as possible to the optima [18, 14]. Artificial intelligence has tradition-
ally studied multi-issue negotiations where utility functions are represented as a
linear combination of the issues involved in the negotiation process [5, 6, 9, 15].
In linear utility functions, issue values are usually monotonic, so these functions
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usually have a single global optimum and consequently, the utility function is
easy to optimize. Nevertheless, most real world problems are hardly modeled
by linear utility functions since they have a higher degree of complexity than
that offered by linear utility functions (e.g. e-commerce [17, 33, 13] ). Some of
the issues in the negotiation setting may present interdependence relationships.
Thus, the value of the utility function may be drastically changed by the pos-
itive/negative synergy of interdependent issues. The result is that the utility
function is no longer linear, and there may, therefore, be several local optima.
Optimizing non-linear utility functions is hard by itself (e.g. it may require
non-linear optimizers such as simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, etc.), as
is learning opponent preferences and looking for good agreements. Utility func-
tions that have the trait of being non-linear are usually known in the literature
as complex utility functions.
Over the last few years, there has been an effort to research negotiation
strategies that are capable of working with such complex utility functions where
issues may have relationships of interdependence. Works in these complex do-
mains have focused on negotiation strategies that require a mediator [17, 13, 22,
23], or non-mediated strategies that are devised for very specific utility functions
[33]. However, non-mediated strategies are more interesting from the point of
view of AmI environments due to the fact that users enter and leave the sys-
tem in an extremely dynamic way. Thus, it may be difficult to find a trusted
mediator for every possible user. Although non-mediated strategies are more
interesting from the point of view of different domains, there has been a lack of
work in non-mediated strategies for complex utility functions. The work of Lai
et al. [20] presents a non-mediated strategy for general utility functions, which
obviously includes complex utility functions. The strategy is based on the cal-
culation of current iso-utility curves and a similarity heuristic that sends offers
from the current iso-utility curve that are the most similar to the last offers
received from the opponent. However, the entire calculation of the iso-utility
curve may require an exhaustive exploration of the utility function, which may
not be tractable in the case of a large number of issues. Furthermore, if the ex-
ploration of one’s own utility function is not performed in an intelligent way, the
result may be that most of the offers sampled are of no use for the negotiation
process since they might not interest the opponent. Mechanisms that sample as
few offers as possible are needed, especially for environments where devices may
have limited computational resources as is the case with AmI environments.
In this work, a non-mediated bilateral multi-issue negotiation model for AmI
environments is presented. Its main goal is to optimize the computational re-
sources while maintaining a good performance in the negotiation process. The
proposed model is inspired by the seminal work of Lai et al. [20]. The three
main differences between this present work and the work of Lai et al. are: (i)
The present approach assumes that it is not possible to exhaustively search the
utility function. Before the negotiation process starts, each agent samples its
own utility function by means of a niching genetic algorithm (GA) [12, 21]. The
effect of this sampling is that offers obtained are highly fit and significantly dif-
ferent;(ii) A few additional samples are obtained during the negotiation process
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by means of genetic operators that are applied over received offers and one’s
own offers. The heuristic behind this sampling is that offers obtained by ge-
netic operators have genetic material from one’s own agent and the opponent’s
offers. Thus, these new offers may be interesting for both parties. (iii) Genetic
operators act as a learning mechanism that implicitly guides the offer sampling
and selection of which offers must be sent to the opponent.
Results show that the proposed work outperforms similarity heuristics that
are able to sample the same number of offers before the negotiation process
starts. Additionally, it is also shown how the proposed strategy is capable of
achieving similar results to those of similarity heuristics that sample the entire
utility function with far fewer samples. This result is accomplished due to the
learning mechanism provided by genetic algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes an example of appli-
cation where automated negotiation and ambient intelligence can be combined
in order to offer a useful service for the user; section 3 describes the negoti-
ation model, explaining the chosen protocol and the new negotiation strategy
in detail. In Section 4, the experimental setting and the results obtained are
discussed. In Section 5 related work is discussed. Finally, the conclusions and
future lines of work are explained in Section 6.
2. An Example of Automated Negotiation and Ambient Intelligence
Synergy: Product Fairs
In this section we introduce an example of application where automated
negotiation may be used along with well-known AmI techonologies in order
to provide a profitable service for users. The example is focused on product
fairs. Fairs are public events where manufacturers/sellers/producers exhibit
their products to a wide range of consumers who go from small consumers to
big retailers. At this kind of events there are usually a large number of exhibitors
and products. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to explore the whole fair or
find interesting deals for one’s interests. It is also difficult for sellers to attract
interesting clients. Thus, both consumers and sellers would be benefited by a
tool which allows them to attract/search prospective deals quickly.
At this point automated negotiation in an AmI environment may come in
handy. Let us suppose the following scenario at a fair: each vendor has been
assigned a booth where he attends to clients. As well as setting up the typical
equipment, a hardware device with Bluetooth wireless communication is pro-
vided (e.g. a PC). An agent, which can be downloaded and configured by the
vendor prior to the fair event day, is installed in this hardware device, and it
complies with rules and communication protocols established by fair organiz-
ers. These agents should be provided with information regarding its owner’s
preferences by means of user modeling methods such as questionnaires, past
experiences, and so forth.
Additionally, consumers are allowed to download an agent to their mobile
devices prior to the fair event. The only requirement for the mobile device is
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Bluetooth wireless capabilities. The consumer’s agent follows the communica-
tion protocols established by the fair organizers and can be configured similarly
to the vendor’s agent. More specifically, the agent may ask what its owner would
be interested in buying and general questions about the preferences regarding
the possible negotiation attributes.
When consumers and vendors enter the fair, they should start the execution
of their respective agents. Each consumer’s agent offers a negotiation service
which can be invoked by vendors’ agents. Whenever this service is invoked
by a vendor agent, a negotiation process starts between the vendor agent and
the consumer agent. The negotiation process continues until a deal has been
found or one of the parties has decided to leave. If the deal is considered as
interesting by both parties (i.e. utility of the deal higher than a certain threshold
or reservation utility) and the deal is among the best ones for the consumer in
that specific area (determined by which vendors can be reached by Bluetooth
in that space point), the consumer agent and the vendor agent notify their
respective owners regarding the possible deal. However, deals discovered by this
automatic process are not to be considered as binding but as recommendations.
If the deal is considered as interesting enough by the consumer, it may result in
the consumer approaching the vendor’s booth. At that point, both parties may
decide to renegotiate or polish the deal which has been found by their agents.
Since Bluetooth technology has coverage limitations, the service can usually
only be discovered by vendor agents that are nearby. Therefore, negotiation
processes help consumer and vendor agents to find prospective deals as con-
sumers walk around the fair. More specifically, it allows consumers to save
physical time by recommending them the vendors that seem more suitable for
their needs in the area. That way, they only approach vendors in an area who
may have an interesting deal for them. Indirectly, it also helps vendors since
it attracts consumers with high probabilities of buying their goods instead of
losing time with clients with whom the possibilities of making a deal are very
low.
3. Negotiation Model
Negotiation models are composed of a negotiation protocol and a negotiation
strategy. On the one hand, the negotiation protocol defines the communication
rules to be followed by the agents that participate in the negotiation process.
More specifically, it states at which moments the different agents are allowed
to send messages and which kind of messages the agents are allowed to send.
For instance, the Rubinstein alternating protocol specifies [27] that agents are
allowed to send one offer in alternating turns. Basically, the negotiation protocol
acts as a mechanism for the coordination and regulation of the agents that take
part in the negotiation process.
On the other hand, the negotiation strategy defines the different decisions
that the agent will make at each step of the negotiation process. It includes
the opponent’s offers acceptance rule, the selection of which offers are to be
sent to the opponent, the concession strategy, the decision of whether the agent
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should continue in the negotiation process or not, and so forth. Therefore,
the negotiation strategy includes all the decision-making mechanisms that are
involved in the negotiation process.
The negotiation protocol used can be categorized as an alternating proto-
col for bilateral bargaining [27]. More specifically, the protocol used is the
k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al. [20]. The proposed negotiation
strategy belongs to the family of negotiation strategies that use a similarity
heuristic in order to propose new offers to the opponent [6, 20].
3.1. Negotiation Protocol
As mentioned above, the negotiation protocol belongs to the family of alter-
nating protocols for bilateral bargaining. In this kind of protocols, two different
agents negotiate without the need of a mediator. As previously stated, non-
mediated strategies are more adequate for AmI applications since users enter
and leave the AmI system in a very dynamic way. Thus, it may not be feasible
to find a trusted mediator for every possible pair of agents. Furthermore, in
some AmI domains such as shopping malls, where there are different competing
vendors and lots of potential users, it is difficult to determine who will mediate
the negotiation process.
The protocol used is the k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al. [20].
This protocol is composed of several rounds where the agents exchange offers
in an alternating way. One of the agents, called the initiator, is responsible for
starting the current round. He can accept one of the previous offers received
from the opponent in the last round, exit from the negotiation process, or send
up to k different offers to the opponent agent. Once the initiator has performed
one of the possible actions, the opponent agent is able to accept one of the
offers he has just received, exit from the negotiation process or propose up to
k different offers to the initiator. Then, the round ends and a new round is
initiated by the initiator agent. The negotiation process ends when one of the
agents accepts an offer (the negotiation succeeded) or one of the agents decides
to abandon the negotiation (the negotiation failed).
Some of the properties of the k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al.
are:
• The protocol is adequate for situations where both agents are equal in
power (e.g. none of them has the monopoly over a resource).
• Each agent is capable of sending up to k different offers, making it more
probable that one of the proposed offers satisfies the requirements of the
opponent agent.
• Since k different offers are proposed in each agent’s turn more informa-
tion about opponent preferences can be inferred, increasing the chances of
finding a win-win situation. This may produce faster agreements, which
is inherently interesting for every domain but particularly for AmI do-
mains since it may reduce the number of messages exchanged and thus
the bandwidth consumption.
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AGENT A AGENT B
Propose (OfferA1,OfferA2,OfferA3)
Propose (OfferB1,OfferB2,OfferB3)
Propose (OfferA4,OfferA5)
Accept (OfferA4)
Figure 1: An example of two agents in the k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al. [20]
An example of two agents negotiating with a 3-alternating protocol (k = 3)
can be observed in Figure 1. Agent A is the initiator of the negotiation round,
whereas Agent B is the responding agent. The first round starts with 3 offers
proposed by the initiator. Once the offers reach Agent B, he decides whether
he should accept one of them or not. Since the 3 offers are not interesting for
Agent B, he decides to counteroffer 3 different offers. When the 3 first offers
from Agent B reach Agent A, the second round starts. Due to the fact that
none of the offers proposed by Agent B are of interest to the initiator, he decides
to send 2 offers. The 2 offers from the initiator reach Agent B, who analyzes
the offers in order to determine whether they are interesting. Since he found
OfferA4 to be interesting, he decides to accept it and the protocol thus ends
with an agreement.
3.2. Negotiation Strategy
The proposed negotiation strategy can be classified within the group of
strategies that use similarity heuristics to propose new offers to the opponent
[6, 20]. The proposal complements some of the benefits introduced in the inspir-
ing work of Lai et al. [20], making it especially interesting for AmI environments.
The goal is to optimize the computational resources while maintaining a good
performance in the negotiation process. The main traits of the proposed model
are twofold. Firstly, it is not necessary to sample the entire utility function.
Secondly, the proposed strategy provides an implicit learning mechanism that
guides the offer sampling and which of the offers sampled are to be sent to the
opponent.
The different decision-making mechanisms of the negotiation strategy can be
grouped according to the period during which they are applied: pre-negotiation
and negotiation. The former group of decision making is applied before the
negotiation process starts. Basically, since utility functions are complex and it
is not feasible to completely explore them, each agent samples its own utility
function by means of a niching GA (self-sampling).
The latter group of mechanisms is applied during the negotiation process.
It includes the acceptance criteria for opponent offers, the concession strategy,
the evolutionary sampling, and the selection of which offers are to be sent.
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The most remarkable part is introduced with evolutionary sampling : genetic
operators are carried out over received offers and one’s own offers in order to
sample new offers that may be of interest to both parties. Evolutionary sampling
acts as an implicit learning mechanism of the opponent’s preferences. The result
of evolutionary sampling may be used afterwards when the offers to be sent to
the opponent are selected. A brief outline of the proposed strategy can be
observed in Algorithm 1. A more detailed outline of the strategy used before
the negotiation process and during the negotiation process can be observed in
Algorithms 2 and 3.
Algorithm 1 A brief outline of the negotiation strategy
Negotiation Strategy
Pre-negotiation
1.Self-sampling
Negotiation Process
2.Receive opponent offer(s) if there are any offers
3.Acceptance criteria: accept an offer and end the negotiation, or reject all of
them and continue the negotiation process
4.Concession strategy
5.Evolutionary sampling
6.Select which offers to send
7.Send offer(s) and go to step 2
3.2.1. Pre-negotiation: Self-sampling
When an agent uses complex utility functions to represent its preferences it
may be difficult to find own offers with good utility. If the number of issues
is not very large the complete sampling of the utility function may be feasible.
However, when the number of issues is large, this complete sampling may be an
extremely expensive process. For instance, a complete sampling of a negotiation
domain formed by 10 integer issues from 0 to 9 requires sampling 1010 offers. The
cost associated to this sampling can be exorbitant, especially if agent preferences
change with a frequency that is greater than the time invested in the sampling.
Furthermore, this sampling is unacceptable for AmI domains. Not only does it
take too much computational time and power, but it would also need too much
storage for the limited devices usually found in these domains. The sampling
process can be reduced by skipping offers that are of very low quality for the
agent (i.e., offers with utility equal to zero).
A possible solution to this problem is to use mechanisms that enable to
sample good offers for the negotiation process and skip those of low quality.
Due to the highly non-linear nature of complex utility functions, non-linear
optimizers are required for this task. The main goal is to sample a set of
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different offers that have good utility and are significantly different, because
these offers may point to different regions of the negotiation space where a good
deal may be found for the agent.
In this work, a genetic algorithm (GA) was used to solve this problem. GA’s
are general search and optimization mechanisms based on the Darwinian selec-
tion process for species [11, 12]. Genetic operators such as crossover, mutation,
and selection are employed in order to find near-optimal solutions for the re-
quired problem. Nevertheless, the problem posed by classic GA’s is that the
entire population converges to one optimal solution. As already stated, differ-
ent interesting offers for the negotiation process need to be explored. Niching
methods are introduced to confront problems of this kind [21, 25]. These meth-
ods look to converge to multiple, highly fit, and significantly different solutions.
A possible family of niching methods for GA’s is the crowding approach [25].
Crowding methods achieve the desired result by introducing local competition
among similar individuals. One advantage of crowding methods is that they do
not require parameters beyond the classic GA’s. Euclidean distance is usually
used to assess the similarity among individuals. Probabilistic Crowding (PC)
and Deterministic Crowding (DC) [25] are two of the most popular crowding
methods. They only require a special selection rule with respect to classic GA’s.
Both rules are employed to select a winner given n different individuals. On the
one hand, DC selects the individual that has the highest fitness value, resulting
in an elitist selection strategy. On the other hand, PC allows lower fitness value
individuals to be selected as winners with a certain probability. This probability
is usually proportional to the fitness of each individual. PC behavior is more
exploratory than DC . In both cases, the niching effect is achieved by applying
either of the two rules to those individuals that are similar. Each parent is
usually paired with one of its children in such a way that the sum of the distances
between pair elements is minimal. For each pair, one of the two crowding rules
is employed to determine which individuals will form the next generation. DC
and PC can be observed in more detail in Equations 1 and 2, respectively.
Dc(s1, s2) =
 s1 f(s1) > f(s2)s2 f(s1) < f(s2)
s1 ∨ s2 other
(1)
Pc(s1, s2) =

s1 f(s1) > f(s2) ∧ rand ≤ p1
s2 f(s1) > f(s2) ∧ rand > p2
s2 f(s1) < f(s2) ∧ rand ≤ p2
s1 f(s2) < f(s1) ∧ rand > p1
s1 ∨ s2 other
(2)
with pi =
f(si)
f(si) + f(si′)
where rand ∈ [0, 1], f(.) is the fitness function, s1 and s2 are two solutions,
and p1 and p2 are the probability of acceptance of both solutions given the pair
(s1, s2).
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The designed mechanism uses a GA that employs crowding methods to find
significantly different good offers. This GA is individually executed by the agent
before the negotiation process begins. The chromosomes of this GA represent
possible offers in the negotiation process, whereas the fitness function used is
one’s own utility function. A portfolio with DC and PC is used. The population
has a fixed number of individuals and the whole population is selected to form
part of the genetic operator pool. Pairs of parents are selected randomly and
multi-point crossover or mutation operators are applied over them. In both
cases, the result is two children. Each parent is paired with the child that
is more similar to it according to Euclidean distance. PC or DC is applied
to each of the pairs according to an established probability pdc and 1 − pdc
respectively. Those individuals that are selected as winners by the crowding
replace the current generation. The stop criterion was set to a specific number
of generations. At the end of the process, the whole population should have
converged to different good offers that are to be used by the negotiation process
as an approximation to the real utility function of the agent. This population,
called P , is used as an input for the negotiation process. A more detailed outline
of the proposed GA can be observed in Algorithm 2.
3.2.2. Negotiation: Concession strategy
A concession strategy determines which utility the agent will try to achieve
at each negotiation step. The agent usually proposes offers that have a utility
equal or above the utility level defined by its concession strategy at a specific
negotiation round. In this work, we assume a time-dependent strategy, where
the utility required by each agent depends on the remaining negotiation time.
This kind of concession strategies are adequate for environments such as AmI,
where time is a limitation (e.g., limited power devices, goods that loose their
value as time passes, real-time environments, etc.). Some examples of concession
strategies are sit-and-wait [1] (no concession until the deadline, e.g. one of the
agents has monopoly), linear (same concession rate at each step), boulware
[5, 29] (no concession until the last rounds, where it quickly concedes to the
reservation value), and conceder [5, 30] (at the start, it quickly concedes to the
reservation value).
One of the traits of similarity-based strategies is that they are usually in-
dependent of the underlying concession strategy. However, this work assumes
an environment where agents have similar market power (similar concession
rate), and similar computational resources (similar deadlines). Thus, a linear
concession strategy is assumed.
In each negotiation round, the agents concede according to their strategy un-
til a private deadline is reached. The minimum utility that an agent a demands
for a negotiation round t can be formalized as follows:
Ua(t) = 1− (1−RUa)( t
Ta
)± δ (3)
where Ua(t) is the minimum demanded utility level for agent a at negotiation
round t, RUa is the reservation utility, δ is a small value that allows to ac-
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Algorithm 2 Pre-negotiation: Genetic algorithm with niching mechanism. Its
goal is to sample the agent utility function
P : Explored preferences, good quality offers
Dc : Deterministic crowding rule
Pc : Probabilistic crowding rule
pcr : Probability of crossover operator
pdc : Probability of DC
n : Current number of generations
nmax : Maximum number of generations
pairi : Pair of solutions
Initialize P
n = 0
Do
n = n+ 1
shuffle P
Paux = ∅
i = 1
While i ≤ |P | − 1
p1 = Pi
p2 = Pi+1
If Random() ≤ pcr
(c1, c2) = crossover(p1, p2)
Else
c1 = mutate(p1)
c2 = mutate(p2)
EndIf
(pair1, pair2) = argmin
pi 6= pj
ck 6= cl
||pi − ck||+ ||pj − cl||
If Random() ≤ pdc
Add(Paux, Dc(pair1))
Add(Paux, Dc(pair2))
Else
Add(Paux, Pc(pair1))
Add(Paux, Pc(pair2))
EndIf
i = i+ 2
EndWhile
P = Paux
While n ≤ nmax
Return P
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cept/select offers which are relatively close, and Ta is the private deadline of the
agent.
3.2.3. Negotiation: Acceptance criteria
The acceptance criteria for an agent usually depend on its concession strat-
egy. Normally, an opponent offer is accepted if it provides a utility that is equal
or greater than the demanded utility for the next negotiation round. Conse-
quently, given the set of offers Xtb→a received by agent a from agent b at instant
t, the acceptance criteria for agent a can be formalized as depicted in the fol-
lowing expression:
Acceptta(X
t
b→a) =
 accept Va(x
t,best
b→a ) ≥ Ua(t+ 1)
reject otherwise
(4)
where Acceptta(X
t
b→a) is the offer acceptance function, Va(x) valuates the utility
of an offer, xt,bestb→a is the best offer received from the opponent at negotiation
round t, and Ua(t+ 1) is the utility demanded for the next negotiation round.
3.2.4. Negotiation: Evolutionary sampling
One of the keys of the proposed strategy is evolutionary sampling. This
provides an implicit mechanism for learning opponent preferences and making
an intelligent sampling. Basically, it is based in the application of some genetic
operators to offers received from the opponent in the last negotiation round and
one’s own good offers from P . The idea behind the evolutionary sampling is
that offers generated by this method have genetic material from the opponent
and one’s own agent. Therefore, these offers may yield a greater probability of
being accepted by the opponent that offers that have been sampled in a blind
way. The new offers are added to a special population called Pevo which contains
offers that have been generated by genetic operators.
Let us consider Xtb→a = [x
t,1
b→a, x
t,2
b→a, ..., x
t,k
b→a], which is the set of offers sent
by agent b to agent a at negotiation round t, and U(t) the current desired utility
to generate offers at negotiation round t. For each offer xt,ib→a, a total of M offers
are selected from the current iso-utility curve ICP (offers with a utility equal
to U(t)) defined in the population P . These M offers minimize the expression:
argmin
C ∈ ICP
|C| = M
M∑
j=1
||xt,ib→a − cj || (5)
where C is the set ofM different offers, and ||xt,ib→a−cj || is the Euclidean distance
between one of the offers in C and the offer received from the opponent. Thus,
these M offers are the ones most similar to xt,ib→a from iso-utility curve in P
and they will be involved in the evolutionary process. Offers are selected from
the current iso-utility curve since offers with much greater utility may generate
new offers with a utility that is no longer useful in the negotiation process
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2 10 1 18 5
8 11 4 6 0
xt,ib→a
cj
Agent proposals: Each phenotype corresponds to the 
value of a negotiation issue
Total number of issues from the opponent (agent b): 3
Specific issues from the opponent (agent b) proposal: 1, 4, 5
Specific issues from agent's a proposal: 2, 3
Crossover
2 11 4 18 5s1
Figure 2: An example of a crossover operation
(e.g. a utility greater than the current utility), and offers with lower utility
may produce new offers that are not to be used until the last rounds of the
negotiation process. Furthermore, the M selected offers are the most similar
since applying crossover operators over offers that are too different may disrupt
the quality of the solution for both agents (the resulting offer is too far from
both agents’ offers).
Once the M closest offers have been selected, a total of ncross crossover op-
erations are performed for each pair (xt,ib→a, cj), where cj ∈ C. The crossover
operator takes two parents and generates one child. More specifically, the num-
ber of issues that come from xt,ib→a is chosen randomly from 1 and N − 1, with
N being the number of issues. The rest of the issues come from cj . Which par-
ticular issues come from each parent is also decided randomly. This way, each
agent’s preferences are taken into account in a statistically equal manner. Each
child is added to a special pool, called Pevo, that contains new offers sampled
during the different evolutionary sampling phases. An example of a crossover
operation can be observed in Figure 2.
A total of nmut mutation operations are carried out for each generated child
by crossover operations. The mutation operator changes issue values randomly,
according to a certain probability of mutating individual issues (pattr). When
pattr is low, mutated offers are close to the original offer, so the effect is the
exploration of the neighborhood of the offer. The operator is applied nmut
times to each child that is produced by crossover operations and to the original
offers from the opponent. Mutation also generates new children that are added
to the special pool Pevo
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Note that no offer from Pevo is discarded even though their utility may
be considered too low for the current negotiation round. The reason for this
mechanism is that offers that are not currently acceptable may be interesting
in future negotiation rounds due to the concession strategy. Furthermore, since
they have genetic material from the opponent’s offers, they are more likely to
be accepted.
As can be observed in Algorithm 3, if the negotiation process lasts nround
rounds, the Evolutionary Sampling will have explored a total number of offers
that is equal to:
Samplesevo = nround ∗ ((k ∗M ∗ ncross) + (k ∗M ∗ ncross) ∗ nmut + k ∗ nmut)
= nround ∗ k ∗ (M ∗ ncross ∗ (1 + nmut) + nmut)
Then, the number of offers sampled during the negotiation process depends on
the number of rounds that the negotiation lasts, k, M , and the number of genetic
operators that are performed per offer selected from the iso-utility curve.
3.2.5. Negotiation: Select which offers to send
The next step in specifying the negotiation strategy consists of defining the
mechanism to propose new offers. In this case, it is necessary to devise a mech-
anism that is capable of proposing up to k different offers to the opponent and
taking into account the preferences of the opponent. The applied heuristic takes
into account the k offers received from the opponent and the offers in P and
Pevo.
In order to select these offers, k offers from the current iso-utility curve are
sent. More specifically, two different iso-utility curves are calculated. The first
one is the iso-utility curve calculated using offers in P , called ICP . The second
one is the iso-utility curve calculated using offers in Pevo, called ICE . Basically,
the first iso-utility curve has offers that were generated during the self-sampling
(only taking into account one’s own preferences), whereas the second iso-utility
curve only has offers that were generated in the evolutionary sampling (they may
take into account both agents’ preferences). The negotiation strategy defines a
proportion of ppevo offers to come from ICE . The rest of the offers come from
ICP .
The offers selected from ICE are those that minimize the distance to any offer
received from the opponent in the previous negotiation round. This selection
may be formalized as:
argmin
C⊂ICE
|C|=ppevo∗k
 C∑
j=1
min
x∈Xtb→a
||cj − x||
 (6)
On the other hand, offers are also selected from ICP . The total number of
offers corresponds to a proportion that is equal to 1− ppevo. In this case, offers
that are the closest to any offer received from the opponent in the previous
negotiation round are selected. This selection can be formalized as:
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argmin
D⊂ICP
|D|=(1−ppevo)∗k
 D∑
j=1
min
x∈Xtb→a
||dj − x||
 (7)
The parameter ppevo determines the degree of relevance of the new offers
sampled during the evolutionary sampling with respect to the offers sampled
before the negotiation process. When ppevo = 0, the strategy ignores the re-
sults that come from Pevo. Consequently, only offers that were sampled in the
pre-negotiation phase (self-sampling) are sent to the opponent. In this particu-
lar case, the strategy is equivalent to a negotiation strategy that only samples
before the negotiation process and does not take into account the opponent’s
preferences. In contrast, when ppevo = 1, the offers sampled during the evolu-
tionary sampling are the only ones taken into account. In any case, ppevo is a
parameter to be adjusted.
3.2.6. Case Study
We prepared a very simple case based on the product fair example. To
be more specific, it depicts a purchase in a furniture fair where one buyer is
interested in buying chairs and tables from a seller. It should be pointed out
that the goal of this case study is not to test the performance of the model,
which will be thoroughly studied in Section , but to show show a trace of the
negotiation model from the point of view of one of the agents. In this case, we
will focus on the buyer.
We used the weighted constraint model proposed by Ito et al. [13] to repre-
sent the utility functions of the buyer and the seller. The weighted constraint
model was introduced as a complex utility function to model agent preferences.
Let us consider a negotiation model where the number of issues is N , si repre-
sents the i-th issue, each issue has a domain si ∈ [0, X] that sets its maximum
and minimum value, and ~s = (s1, s2, ..., sN ) represents a particular offer. These
settings make up an N-dimensional space for the utility function.
In the weighted constraint model, a constraint cl represents a specific region
of the space. Any point of the space enclosed in that region is said to satisfy
the constraint cl. Basically, the term constraint represents an interdependence
relationship among the negotiation issues. Each constraint cl has a certain value
v(cl, ~s) that is added to the utility of ~s when the constraint is satisfied by the
point ~s. For instance, a constraint defined as cl = (1 ≤ s1 ≤ 10 ∧ 3 ≤ s2 ≤ 4)
and v(cl, ~s) = 10 would hold a utility of 10 for the point (2,3) of the space.
A utility function in the weighted constraint model is formed by l constraints
whose values are summed up whenever the constraints are satisfied. The utility
of a point ~s given l constraints can be defined as:
U(~s) =
∑
cl∈L
v(cl, ~s) (8)
where ~s is the point/offer, cl is a constraint, L is the set of constraints, and
v(cl, ~s) is the value of the constraint if it is satisfied (0 otherwise).
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Algorithm 3 Negotiation strategy during the negotiation process
P: Offers from self-sampling Pnew: Offers from evolutionary sampling
k: Number of offers of the protocol M: Number of selected offers
ncross: Number of times to crossover nmut: Number of times to mutate
ppnew: Proportion of offers from Pnew
Receive Xtb→ a
If Va(x
t,best
b→ a) ≥ Ua(t+ 1) then Accept
Update current utility t=t+1
/*Evolutionary sampling*/
For each xt,ib→ a in X
t
b→ a
C = argmin
C⊂ ICP
|C|=M
∑M
j=1 ||xt,ib→ a − cj ||
For each cj in C
Repeat ncross times
s1=Crossover(xt,ib→ a, cj )
If s1 * Pnew then Add(Pnew,s1)
Repeat nmut times
s2=Mutate(s1)
If s2 * Pnew then Add(Pnew,s2)
EndRepeat
EndRepeat
EndFor
Repeat nmut times
s1=Mutate(xt,ib→ a)
If s1 * Pnew then Add(Pnew,s1)
EndRepeat
EndFor
/*Select which offers to send*/
k1 = ppnew ∗ k
X1 = argmin
C⊂ ICE
|C|=k1
∑C
j=1 min
x ∈ Xt
b→ a
||cj − x||
k2 = (1− ppnew) ∗ k
X2 = argmin
D⊂ ICP
|D|=k2
∑D
j=1 min
x ∈ Xt
b→ a
||dj − x||
Xt+1a→ b = X1 ∪ X2
Send Xt+1a→ b
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As stated in [13], although the expression seems linear, it produces a non-
linear utility space due to the interdependence among the issues represented
by the constraints. Furthermore, the utility function may generate spaces with
several local maxima, which makes the problem highly non-linear and very diffi-
cult to optimize. Additionally, the agents do not have any knowledge about the
possible constraints of the opponent, thus making the problem of negotiation
still more difficult.
This negotiation case consists of 3 different attributes: price (P) [0-9], chair
model (CM) [0-9], and table model (TM) [0-9]. Next, we introduce the utility
functions we employed to represent the preferences of both consumer and seller:
Buyer Utility Function Seller Utility Function
(v1 = 100) (0 ≤ P ≤ 1) (v1 = 80) (8 ≤ P ≤ 9)
(v2 = 50) (2 ≤ P ≤ 4) (v2 = 60) (6 ≤ P ≤ 7)
(v3 = 25) (5 ≤ P ≤ 7) (v3 = 45) (4 ≤ P ≤ 5)
(v4 = 30) (0 ≤ CM ≤ 3) ∧ (0 ≤ TM ≤ 3) (v4 = 20) (1 ≤ P ≤ 3)
(v5 = 10) (0 ≤ CM ≤ 3) ∧ (6 ≤ TM ≤ 9) (v5 = 15) (1 ≤ CM ≤ 2)
(v6 = 50) (0 ≤ CM ≤ 3) ∧ (5 ≤ TM ≤ 6) (v6 = 10) (0 ≤ CM ≤ 1)
(v7 = 30) (4 ≤ CM ≤ 6) ∧ (0 ≤ TM ≤ 3) (v7 = 10) (2 ≤ CM ≤ 5)
(v8 = 20) (4 ≤ CM ≤ 5) ∧ (4 ≤ TM ≤ 5) (v8 = 5) (5 ≤ CM ≤ 9)
(v9 = 10) (4 ≤ CM ≤ 5) ∧ (8 ≤ TM ≤ 9) (v9 = 20) (8 ≤ CM ≤ 9)
(v10 = 50) (7 ≤ CM ≤ 9) ∧ (2 ≤ TM ≤ 4) (v10 = 60) (0 ≤ TM ≤ 1)
(v11 = 20) (7 ≤ CM ≤ 9) ∧ (6 ≤ TM ≤ 8) (v11 = 30) (1 ≤ TM ≤ 4)
(v12 = 5) (4 ≤ TM ≤ 6)
(v13 = 20) (6 ≤ TM ≤ 9)
(v14 = 10) (8 ≤ TM ≤ 9)
The consumer shows attribute interdependences relating the two types of
furniture (e.g. some pairs of models fit better than other pairs). In the case
of the seller, no interdependences are found but he may present preferences
regarding which models to sell (e.g. some of them need to be manufactured;
some models only have a few units, etc.).
As for the parameters of the self-sampling phase, they were set to |P | =
16, nmax = 100, pdc = 80% and pcr = 80%. The rest of parameters of the
negotiation model were set to δ = 0.05, k = 2, T = 10, ppevo = 100%, ncross = 2,
nmut = 2, and M = 2.
The next table shows the 16 offers found by the self-sampling process carried
out by the buyer. It depicts the value for each attribute and the utility of the
offer. In this case the utility has been scaled to [0,1] for the sake of simplicity.
P=Self-sampling results for the buyer
(u = 1.00) 1 1 6 (u = 0.81) 1 3 0
(u = 1.00) 0 1 6 (u = 0.81) 1 5 3
(u = 0.93) 1 7 3 (u = 0.62) 0 2 4
(u = 0.93) 1 7 4 (u = 0.62) 1 9 1
(u = 0.93) 1 9 2
(u = 0.93) 1 2 5
(u = 0.93) 1 8 3
(u = 0.93) 1 8 4
(u = 0.93) 0 7 3
(u = 0.93) 1 9 3
(u = 0.93) 0 1 5
(u = 0.81) 1 5 0
Round 1 Us(1) = 1 − 0.95 Ub(1) = 1 − 0.95. Once the self-sampling phase has
ended, the negotiation process starts with the buyer acting as initiator. Since
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there are no opponent offers to value, evolutionary sampling is skipped and
the agent directly proposes offers to the opponent. Due to the fact that no
evolutionary sampling has been carried out, Pevo is empty and only the iso-
utility curve which can be calculated comes from P. X=(1 1 6) and Y=(0 1 6)
are randomly selected since there is no opponent offer to compare with. The
opponent rejects the offers since they yield a utility of 0.35 and 0.25 respectively.
The opponent makes a counteroffer which contains W=(8 1 1) and Z=(9 1 1).
Both of them are rejected since their utilities (0.18 for both of them) are lower
than Us(2) = 0.85.
Round 2 Us(2) = 0.95−0.85 Ub(2) = 0.95−0.85. Two offers have been received
from the opponent. Thus, the evolutionary sampling phase is carried out. The
iso-utility curve from P (Us(2) = 0.95 − 0.85) is shown in the following tables.
It shows the offers and the euclidean distance to W and Z. For both W and
Z, the M = 2 offers which are more similar are selected. These offers selected
from the iso-utility curve become one of the parents for the genetic operations,
which are also shown in the following tables. For the sake of simplicity, genetic
operations which produced children that were already in Pevo are not included
(nor are they stored more than once). All of the offers generated during this
phase are added to Pevo.
Iso-utility curve (P)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 2 5 0.90 1.00
0 1 5 0.99 1.09
1 7 3 1.04 1.13
1 7 4 1.07 1.16
1 8 3 1.12 1.20
0 7 3 1.13 1.22
1 8 4 1.14 1.22
1 9 2 1.18 1.26
1 9 3 1.20 1.27
Genetic Operations
Crossover Mutation
Parent 1 Parent 2 Child Parent 1 Child
8 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 8 2 5 8 2 5 (u=0.34) 6 2 1
8 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.81) 1 1 1 1 1 1 (u=0.68) 1 1 7
8 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.81) 0 1 1 1 1 1 (u=0.18) 8 1 1
9 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 9 1 5 8 1 1 (u=0.31) 2 1 4
9 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 9 2 5 8 1 1 (u=0.15) 5 7 1
9 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.31) 9 1 5 9 1 5 (u=0.46) 6 1 5
9 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.81) 0 1 1 9 1 5 (u=0.62) 1 8 5
9 2 5 (u=0.81) 1 2 3
9 2 5 (u=0.15) 7 6 5
9 1 1 (u=0.50) 4 0 1
9 1 1 (u=0.37) 9 2 6
Next, it is necessary to select which offers to send to the opponent. Since
ppevo = 100%, if possible, all of the offers will come from the iso-utility curve
calculated using Pevo. If it is not possible, it will take as many offers as possible
from the iso-utility curve from Pevo and take the rest from the iso-utility curve
from P . In this case, X=(1 2 5) and Y=(0 1 5) are selected from P since Pevo
does not contain elements to form a current iso-utility curve. The opponent
receives the offers X and Y. Since they yield a utility of 0.25 and 0.15 respectively,
both are rejected. The seller sends W=(6 1 1) and Z=(9 4 1) as counteroffers.
Both of them are rejected since their utilities (0.34 and 0.18 respectively) are
lower than Us(3) = 0.75.
Round 3 Us(2) = 0.85−0.75 Ub(2) = 0.85−0.75. Two offers have been received
from the opponent. Thus, the evolutionary sampling phase is carried out. The
iso-utility curve from P (Us(2) = 0.85− 0.75) and genetic operations are shown
in the following tables.
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Iso-utility curve (P)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 3 0 0.60 0.90
1 5 0 0.72 0.90
1 5 3 0.74 0.92
Genetic Operations
Crossover Mutation
Parent 1 Parent 2 Child Parent 1 Child
6 1 1 1 3 0 (u=0.81) 1 3 1 1 3 1 (u=0.00) 8 8 1
6 1 1 1 3 0 (u=0.34) 6 1 0 1 3 1 (u=0.62) 1 6 7
6 1 1 1 5 0 (u=0.81) 1 1 0 6 1 1 (u=0.34) 6 2 1
9 4 1 1 3 0 (u=0.18) 9 4 0 6 1 1 (u=0.21) 6 1 8
9 4 1 1 5 0 (u=0.81) 1 5 1 1 1 0 (u=1.00) 0 1 6
1 8 5 (u=0.62) 1 8 5
9 4 0 (u=0.18) 9 5 0
9 4 0 (u=0.81) 1 4 1
9 4 1 (u=0.18) 8 4 1
9 4 1 (u=0.18) 9 6 1
1 5 1 (u=0.62) 1 7 0
1 5 1 (u=0.31) 4 7 1
Next, it is necessary to select which offers to send to the opponent. The
table below shows the iso-utility curve calculated from Pevo. In this case, X=(1
1 1) and Y=(1 1 0) are selected from Pevo. The opponent receives the offers X
and Y. Since they yield a utility of 0.69 and 0.53 respectively, both are rejected.
However, in this round, the seller sends W=(4 1 1) as counteroffer. The offer is
rejected because its utility is equal to 0.5, and is thus lower than Ub(4) = 0.65.
From this point on we will overlook the inner steps of the model due to the fact
that the way it works has already been described.
Iso-utility curve (Pevo)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 1 0 0.56 0.95
0 1 1 0.66 1.05
1 4 1 0.64 0.88
1 3 1 0.59 0.89
1 5 1 0.71 0.89
1 1 1 0.55 0.94
1 2 3 0.60 0.94
Round 4 Us(2) = 0.75 − 0.65 Ub(2) = 0.75 − 0.65. In this round, the buyer
sends X=(1 1 7), which yields a utility of 0.33 for the seller. Therefore, the
offer is rejected. Then, the opponent sends W=(1 1 1) and Z=(1 2 1), Z being
accepted by the buyer since its utility is equal to 0.81. The negotiation process
ends with the deal (Ub = 0.81,Us = 0.69), which is the Nash Bargaining Point
for this negotiation case.
This section has described the main traits of the proposed negotiation model
for AmI environments. More specifically, it has explained the protocol employed,
and the negotiation strategy that is adapted to AmI domains thanks to the in-
telligent sampling provided by genetic operators during the negotiation process.
Additionally, we have also shown how the proposed model works in a small case
study. In the next section the proposed model is tested in several scenarios to
check its performance.
4. Experiments
The performance of the devised strategy is detailed in this section. The
proposed negotiation model was tested against the weighted constraint model
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proposed by Ito et al. [13]. This model makes it possible to represent unre-
stricted interdependence relationships among the negotiation issues. Further-
more, if the number of constraints is large, it can represent highly non-linear
utility functions. Therefore, it represents a proper testbed for the proposed
strategy. Nevertheless, as in the work of Lai et al. [20], the proposed nego-
tiation model is general and does not depend on a particular utility function.
The model of Ito et al. was selected as a testbed because it provides a well
studied utility function [13, 22, 23] that holds enough complexity to study the
real performance of the negotiation model.
Firstly, the negotiation setting employed in the experiments is briefly de-
scribed. After this, the different experiments and their results are presented.
Finally, a brief discussion summarizing the results of the experiments is included.
4.1. Negotiation setting
The aim of these experiments was to evaluate whether or not the proposed
model is capable of working in domains where the agents’ utility functions are
highly non-linear. For that purpose, different negotiation cases where randomly
created:
• Number of issues N = [4-7].
• Integer issues. si ∈ [0, 9].
• L = N∗5 uniformly distributed constraints per agent. There are con-
straints for every possible interdependence cardinality. For instance if
N=4, there are 5 unary constraints, 5 binary constraints, 5 trinary con-
straints and 5 quaternary constraints.
• v(cl, .) for each n-ary constraint drawn randomly from [0, 100 ∗ n].
• For every constraint, the constraint width for each issue si is uniformly
drawn from [2, 4]. For instance, if the constraint width for issue s1 is 3,
then (0 ≤ s1 ≤ 3), (1 ≤ s1 ≤ 4), (2 ≤ s1 ≤ 5), (3 ≤ s1 ≤ 6), (4 ≤ s1 ≤ 7),
(5 ≤ s1 ≤ 8) and (6 ≤ s1 ≤ 9) are all of the possible configurations for
issue s1 in the constraint (just one is used in the constraint).
• Agent deadline T = 10. Agents do not know their opponent’s private
deadlines.
• Agent reservation utility RU = 0. Agents do not know their opponent’s
private reservation utilities.It is set to zero in order to find a deal, if
possible. Should this be the case, the deal is checked against certain
thresholds which will determine whether the application notifies its owner
of the possible deal.
• Agents do not know their opponent’s utility functions
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For each number of issues, a total of 100 negotiation cases were generated
with the above settings. The execution of each case was repeated 30 times in
order to allow for the possible differences between different executions of the
methods.
In order to evaluate the quality of the agreements found by the participant
agents, some measures were gathered at the end of each negotiation.
• Euclidean distance to the closest Pareto frontier point [28]. This is a
measure of economic efficiency for agreements. The closer to the Pareto
frontier, the better.
• Euclidean distance to the Nash Product [28]. Since both agents have the
same concession strategy and the same deadline it is also feasible to study
the distance to the Nash Product. This is the point that maximizes the
product u1 ∗ u2 in the Pareto Frontier, where u1 is the utility of agent 1,
and u2 is the utility of agent 2.
• Number of negotiation rounds. Faster agreements are preferred since a
lesser number of messages are exchanged, less bandwidth is needed, and
limited devices need less power to send messages.
Additionally, some experiments were also devised in order to test the com-
putational performance of the proposed model in a real environment. Measures
such as the time spent in decision making tasks before the negotiation process
(self-sampling) and during the negotiation process (opponent offer acceptance
phase, evolutionary sampling, and offer proposal) were gathered. For that pur-
pose, the proposed model was implemented using a HTC Desire (1 Ghz, 576MB
RAM, Android Operating System) as one of the parties and a PC (2 Ghz,
4096MB RAM, Ubuntu Operating System) as the other party. A total number
of 30 negotiations were carried out in order to measure the computational cost
of the proposed model.
4.2. Results
The proposed strategy, which will be named as Evolutionary Sampling or
ES, was compared with two different negotiation models. The first strategy is
an implementation of the general framework proposed by Lai et al. [20]. This
model is provided with the whole sampling of the utility function, so that it
can completely calculate iso-utility curves. It is used as a measure of how close
the proposed strategy is to the ideal case where all of the offers are available.
The second model assumes that it is not possible to completely sample all of
the offers. Therefore, it samples before the negotiation process by means of a
niching GA (self-sampling) and uses the similarity heuristic (ppevo = 0) during
the negotiation process, which will be named as Non Evolutionary Sampling or
NES model. The number of samples explored by the NES model before the
negotiation process is set equal to the number of samples explored by the ES
model (|P | + Samplesevo). Consequently, both the NES and ES model yield
the same computational cost in every experimentation.
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Four different experiments were carried out in order to test the proposed
model. In the first experiment, the three different models are compared as the
number of issues is increased. The second experiment, studies the impact of
the proportion of offers (ppevo) that are sent from the special pool Pevo in the
ES model. Next, the three models are compared as the number of proposals k
increases. Finally, the ES and the NES model are compared as the size of the
population (|P |) provided by the self-sampling increases.
4.2.1. Experiment 1: Performance study on the number of issues
The goal of this experiment is to study how the proposed strategy behaves
for negotiations with a different number of issues N = {4, 5, 6, 7}. It is impor-
tant that the proposed model be capable of properly handle negotiations with
multiple issues since most real world domains, including AmI domains, need to
reach agreements for multiple issues. A negotiation setting where agents are
limited to k = 3 proposals per negotiation round is used. The three different
models were tested during this experiment.
The parameters of the self-sampling were set to nmax = 100, pdc = 80% and
pcr = 80%. The number of samples optimized before the negotiation process
was set to |P | = 128 for the ES model and to |P | = 128 + Samplesevo for the
NES model.
The parameters of the ES were set to M = 5, ncross = 4, nmut = 4,
pattr = 30%, and ppevo = 100%. Therefore, all the offers are sent from the sam-
ples generated by the evolutionary sampling carried out during the negotiation
process.
The distance to the Nash Product, the distance to the closer Pareto Frontier
Point and the number of negotiation rounds were measured for the three models.
The results for this experiment can be found in Figure 3. Intuitively speaking,
since the number of offers sampled remains constant and the number of issues
increases, the performance of the NES and the ES model should be worsened
with respect to the results achieved by the model of Lai et al. However, the
results for the ES do not comply with this intuitive hypothesis. As can be
observed, even though the proposed model and the NES model explore the same
number of offers, the NES obtains worse results than the other two models. This
is particularly true as the number of issues increases, since the performance of
this method drastically decreases. On the contrary, the ES model is capable of
achieving statistically equal results to the model of Lai et al., which can access
the whole iso-utility curve. Nevertheless, the proposed model explores far fewer
offers than the complete sampling of the utility function, especially for larger
number of issues. For instance, when N = 6, Lai et al. has access to 106 offers,
whereas the proposed model has only sampled an average of 1510 samples (128+
average Samplesevo).
The ES model has been able to achieve similar results to the case where the
full iso-utility curve can be calculated, while maintaining the offers sampled to
a small number. This result is particularly interesting for AmI domains where
agents may be executed in devices with low computational and storage capabil-
ities. Therefore, fewer samples mean less power consumption and less capacity
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needed to store them. Moreover, it must also be highlighted that the num-
ber of rounds was also lower than that obtained by NES, which, consequently
means fewer messages sent, less bandwidth needed and, of course, less power
consumption by the limited devices.
The reason for this improvement is the intelligent sampling achieved by
the use of genetic operators during the negotiation process. On the contrary,
sampling only before the negotiation process leads to worse results since it is
not capable detecting which offers will be interesting for the negotiation. Both,
the ES and the NES model, have the same computational cost, but the ES is
obviously preferred since it is capable of achieving a better performance.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closest Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation rounds in Experiment 1. The graphic shows the mean and its
associated confidence intervals (95%)
4.2.2. Experiment 2: Performance study on ppevo
In this case, the experiment’s goal is to study how relevant the proportion of
offers that are sent from the offers sampled during the negotiation process (gov-
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erned by the parameter ppevo) in the ES model is. Since all of the configurations
sample new offers during the negotiation process, all of them yield a very similar
computational cost. In fact, it may only be different if one of the configurations
obtains a significantly different number of negotiation rounds. Consequently,
the main subject of study in this scenario is the economic efficiency (distance to
Nash and Pareto Frontier), although some improvements in the computational
cost may be observed due to a lower number of rounds.
The same conditions from the previous experiment were set (k = 3 and
N = {4, 5, 6, 7}), and the same configuration parameters were set for the ES
(M = 5, ncross = 4, nmut = 4, and pattr = 30%). However, in this scenario we
compare the ES model results when 1 out of 3 offers (ppevo = 30%), 2 out of 3
offers (ppevo = 50%), and 3 out of 3 offers (ppevo = 100%) come from the offers
sampled during the evolutionary sampling phase.
The results for this second scenario can be observed in Figure 4. The graphic
shows that the three different configurations yield similar results for the distance
to the Nash Product, the distance to the closest Pareto Frontier Point, and the
number of negotiation rounds. This similarity is explained due to the fact that,
on most occasions, the offer accepted by the opponent is the closest one from the
evolutionary sampling population (Pevo). Therefore, it is always sent, as long
as the results from the evolutionary sampling are not ignored. Nevertheless, it
seems that higher values of ppevo have a slightly better economic and computa-
tional performance than lower ones. The reason for this slight improvement is
that, in some cases, the offer preferred by the opponent may be the second or
third closest from Pevo. Due to this small improvement, higher values of ppevo
are preferred in practice.
4.2.3. Experiment 3: Performance study on k
The next experiment aims to study the performance of the three different
models (Lai et al., NES, and ES ) as the limit to the number of offers k sent per
agent’s round is increased. As mentioned, the number of offers sent may help to
reach agreements faster since agents are capable of finding win-win situations.
This is very important in AmI environments where devices have limited power
and their running time must be optimized. Lai et al. [20], demonstrated how
higher values of k helped to reach better agreements. In this scenario, the
experiment is repeated in order to evaluate whether the differences between the
three models still hold for different values of k.
The studied values of k were 1, 3, 5, and 7. The rest of the negotiation setting
was configured to use negotiation cases with N = 6 issues. The parameters of
the self-sampling were set to the values employed in the previous tests except for
|P | = 256. The parameters of the ES were set to the same conditions described
in Experiment 1.
As it can be observed in Figure 5, the three models achieve better results as
k increases. These results agree with those presented in [20]. Although all of
the models improve, the differences observed in Experiment 1 still hold for this
scenario. The NES model gets worse results than Lai et al. and the proposed
model. On the contrary, the ES obtains results that are statistically equivalent
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Figure 4: Evolution of the distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closer Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation rounds in Experiment 2. The graphic shows the mean and its
associated confidence intervals (95%)
to the case when the full iso-utility curve can be calculated. As a matter of fact,
for higher values of k the proposed model gets slightly better results than Lai
et al. Nevertheless, the differences between the two of them are not significant
enough to be considered as relevant.
It must be noted again that the number of offers sampled for ES and NES
is the same and it is much lower than the complete sampling of the utility
function. For instance, in this scenario, the complete sampling consists of 106
offers, whereas the other two methods sampled an average of 773 samples for
k = 1, 1653 for k = 3, 2497 for k = 5, and 3357 for k = 7.
4.2.4. Experiment 4: Performance study on |P | and memory performance
This last experiment was designed to assess the influence of the population
optimized by the self-sampling on the performance of the ES model and the
NES model. It is specially relevant to see how many samples the NES model
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Figure 5: Evolution of the distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closest Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation rounds in Experiment 3. The graphic shows the mean and its
associated confidence intervals (95%)
needs to achieve similar results to those ones obtained by the model proposed in
this article. Obviously, more population means more storage needed and more
computational cost since it needs to optimize more samples.
The average number of samples explored was analyzed for a negotiation
setting where N = 6 and k = 3. The settings used for the self-sampling and
the ES in previous experiments were repeated for this scenario. The number
of sampled offers was increased by allowing more offers to be optimized in the
self-sampling (|P | = 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096).
The results for this experiment can be observed in Figure 6. The x axis of
the graphics show the average number of offers sampled by both models, thus
it shows |P | + averagerounds ∗ Samplesevo. In the case of the NES model all
of the samples were produced before the negotiation process started. Several
observations can be made from the data shown in the graphics. On the one
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hand, it seems that the size of |P | does not have too much of an effect on the
performance of the ES model, since it is more dependent on the exploration
carried out during the negotiation process and does not need as much sampling
to get results similar to the case where the full iso-utility curve can be accessed.
Therefore, the behavior of the model remained almost constant for different
configurations of |P |. Again, this behavior is very adequate for AmI environ-
ments since the model can properly work with configurations that do not require
too many computational resources. On the other hand, the NES model perfor-
mance increased along with the number of offers sampled. It must be noted,
that when the number of samples for both methods was 5506, the two of them
obtained very similar, almost equivalent, results. Therefore, the NES needed
5506 samples to achieve similar results to the same results obtained by the ES
model for 1510 samples. It can be concluded that NES needs 55061510 = 3.64 times
more samples to achieve similar results to ES.
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Number negotiations Memory(KB) NES Memory(KB) ES
1 129 35
3 387 105
5 645 175
7 903 245
10 1290 350
Table 1: Approximate ammount of memory needed by the NES model and the ES model
when executing several negotiations at the same time
It is possible to approximately analyze the total amount of memory employed
by both methods when they achieve statistically equivalent results. As has
been suggested by the previous experiment (Experiment 4), the NES model
needs 5506 samples to achieve statistically equivalent results to those the ES
model with 1510 samples. If we assume that the underlying platform is a 32 bit
platform, where integers usually need 32 bits to be stored, we can approximately
calculate the memory needed by both models as follows:
Memory(KB) = |Samples| ∗N ∗ 32 ∗ 1
8
∗ 1
1024
(9)
where |Samples| is the number of samples, N is the number of attributes of the
negotiation process, 32 is the size of an integer, 18 converts from bits to Bytes,
and 11024 converts from bytes to KBytes. Taking into account the formula above,
the NES model would take 129 KB to store the data needed for the previous type
of negotiation process (N = 6, |Samples| = 5506), whereas the ES model would
take 35 KB (N = 6, |Samples| = 5506). Depending on the underlying device,
this difference may be quite important (e.g. devices with a few MB of storage
available). However, this difference may be still more important if we consider
that in some scenarios it may be necessary to perform several negotiations at the
same time (e.g. the fair scenario). For instance, Table 1 shows the approximate
amount of memory necessary to carry out several negotiations at the same time.
4.2.5. Experiment 5: Time Performance
As introduced earlier, it was also interesting to test the computational per-
formance of the model in a real environment. Thus, the proposed model was
implemented using a HTC (1 Ghz, 576MB RAM, Android Operating System)
as one of the parties and a PC (2 Ghz, 4096MB RAM, Ubuntu Operating Sys-
tem) as the other party. The self-sampling parameters were set to nmax = 100,
pdc = 80% and pcr = 80%. The number of samples optimized before the nego-
tiation process was set to |P | = 128. As for the parameters employed during
the negotiation process, these were set to k = 3, M = 5, ncross = 4, nmut = 4,
pattr = 30%, and ppevo = 100%. The number of attributes of the negotiation
process was N = 5. The time spent in the whole negotiation process (tt), the
time spent in sending/waiting for offers (tm), the time spent in self-sampling
(ts), and the time spent in decision-making during the negotiation process (tdm)
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tt (s) ts (s) tdm (s) tm (s)
0.773 0.264 0.358 0.415
Table 2: Computational performance measures for Experiment 5
were measured. Table 2 shows the mean obtained in seconds for the 30 negoti-
ation cases that were studied.
As can be observed, the time spent for a negotiation process tt was reason-
ably good (less than a second) and it enables negotiations to be carried out in
environments where real-time responses are needed (e.g. Ambient Intelligence).
Moreover, it can also be observed that the time spent in decision-making tasks
tdm does not take as much time as other tasks such as sending/waiting for offers
tm. This leaves room for more negotiation processes to be carried out in paral-
lel during CPU idle time (e.g. waiting for offers). Again, carrying out multiple
negotiation processes simultaneously proves especially interesting again for AmI
environments. For instance, in the fair scenario, it makes it possible to negoti-
ate simultaneously with those vendors who are available in the area where the
consumer is walking at that moment. The time spent in self-sampling is the
least problematic since it is a process to be carried out only once until agent
preferences change. In some AmI environments, such as the fair, we may con-
sider preferences to be static during the fair event. Thus, self-sampling would
only be needed once. Despite all those facts, it must be remarked that the time
spent in self-sampling is reasonably good (less than a second).
4.3. Discussion
Ambient Intelligence domains are characterized as domains where computa-
tional resources are of extreme importance. Users interact with its environment
through devices with limited capabilities, thus the efficient use of resources is
crucial. Furthermore, the environment infrastructures are usually connected by
means of a limited bandwidth wireless connection. Thus, network resources
must also be optimized.
The results obtained by the proposed model, while maintaining fairly good
economic performance, cope with the problems found in AmI environments.
If we assume that limited devices cannot completely sample the agent’s util-
ity function and store those samples, some mechanisms are needed to sample
as few offers as possible. A straightforward method would be sampling some
offers before the negotiation process starts, which is precisely what the NES
model does. However, this sampling does not take advantage of the informa-
tion revealed by the opponent in the negotiation process. Most of the offers
sampled before the negotiation process may be useless since they are of no in-
terest to the opponent. However, the proposed model takes advantage of this
information and employs it to make a more intelligent sample, optimizing the
computational resources. Nevertheless, although computational resources are
important, economic efficiency should not be ignored in AmI negotiations.
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In the previous sections, we were able to observe the behavior of the ES
model in different scenarios. Its performance was compared with a method that
samples the same number of offers before the negotiation process (NES ), and
the ideal case where all of the samples of the utility function are available. The
results of the experiments can be summarized as:
• The proposed model needs very few computational resources and storage
to obtain results statistically equivalent to the ideal case where the all
of the offers are available. It obtained similar results in economic per-
formance (distance to Nash, distance to Pareto Frontier) and number of
negotiation rounds.
• When the proposed model and the NES model sample the same number
of offers, the first obtains better results. In fact, the NES model needs to
sample 3.64 times more offers to obtain similar results.
• The proposed model needs less negotiation rounds to achieve better results
than the NES model. Therefore, the environment bandwidth is optimized
since it needs fewer messages to be sent in order to reach agreements.
Consequently, the proposed model fits perfectly for the conditions needed by
AmI environments, since it needs less computational resources and it obtains
economically efficient results.
5. Related Work
Ambient Intelligence looks to offer personalized services and provide users
with easier and more efficient ways to communicate and interact with other
people and systems [4, 35]. Since several users may coexist in AmI environments,
it is quite probable that their preferences conflict and thus mechanisms are
needed to allow users to cooperate. For instance, imagine a ubiquitous shopping
mall [16, 2] where buying agents have to help users to buy the products, and
vendor agents have to maximize their users’ profits. Automated negotiation
provides mechanisms that solve this particularly interesting problem. Some
authors have already claimed that in most real world negotiations such as e-
commerce [17, 33, 13], issues present interdependence relationships that make
agents’ utility functions complex. Therefore, the problem of complex utility
functions in automated negotiation is also interesting for AmI applications.
Over the last few years, most of the work in automated negotiation has
focused on offering solutions for the case of imperfect knowledge and bounded
computational resources [18, 14]. The use of heuristics is necessary to provide
a solution to problems of this type. The present work can be classified within
this same category of solutions.
Faratin et al. [5] presented a negotiation model for linear utility functions
where a negotiation strategy is composed of different tactics that may be ap-
plied depending on the negotiation time, the quantity of the resource and the
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behavior of the opponent. Nevertheless, the model is only applicable in negoti-
ation with linear utility functions, which are easier cases than those presented
in this present article.
Matos et al. [24] determined the successful strategies for different settings
using the model proposed by Faratin et al. [5]. They employ an evolutionary
approach in which strategies and tactics correspond to the genetic material in
a genetic algorithm. In their experiments, populations of buyers and sellers
with different strategies negotiate in a round robin way. After each round robin
round, strategies are evaluated by means of a fitness function. Then, strategies
are selected to be the parents of the next population according to their fitness
function. In the end, a population of strategies implicitly adapted to the en-
vironment is obtained. They use genetic algorithms as a learning mechanism
of negotiation strategies when placed under certain circumstances. There are
two differences between Matos et al. work and the present work. Firstly, the
negotiation model of Matos et al. is designed for linear utility functions. Sec-
ondly, the genetic algorithm proposed in this present work is an implicit learning
mechanism of the opponent’s preferences that guides the offer sampling during
the negotiation process.
Later, Faratin et al. [6] presented a negotiation strategy for bilateral bar-
gaining that is focused on achieving win-win situations by means of trade-off.
The heuristic applied to perform trade-off is similar to that employed in this
present work. Given an agent’s current utility, the offer from the iso-utility curve
that is most similar to the last offer received from the opponent is sent. The
idea behind this heuristic is that, since the proposed offer is the most similar
to the last offer received from the opponent, it is more likely to be satisfactory
to both participants. A fuzzy similarity criterion is employed to compare offers.
Nevertheless, the use of fuzzy similarity requires some knowledge of opponent
preferences. The application of criteria of this kind is complicated in complex
utility functions due to the interdependencies among the different issues. In
this present work, the Euclidean distance is used, as this does not require any
knowledge about the opponent, and which is independent of the interdependen-
cies among issues.
Fatima et al. [7, 9, 8] analyzed the problem of multi-attribute negotiations
in an agenda-based framework. Agendas determine in which order the different
issues are to be negotiated when negotiations are carried out issue by issue. Once
an agreement has been found on a specific issue, it cannot be changed. Thus,
the agents face the problem of which issues should be negotiated first and which
strategies should be applied. They studied the optimal agendas for different
scenarios. Nevertheless, their work focused on linear utility functions, which
does not take into account the possible interdependences among the different
issues.
The work of Krovi et al. [19] opened the path for GA’s in automated negoti-
ation. Krovi et al. proposed a GA for bilateral negotiations that was performed
each time a negotiation round ended. The population of chromosomes was ran-
domly initialized with 90 random offers and 10 heuristic offers (the last offer
from the opponent and the nine best offers from the previous round). The idea
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behind using GA’s is that the resulting offers have good characteristics for both
agents. However, 60 generations were needed during each round in order to
obtain the next offer, which may turn out to be computationally expensive in
large issue domains. Choi et al. [3] enhanced Krovi’s model with more learning
capabilities. More specifically, it is capable of learning opponent preferences by
means of stochastic approximation and of adapting its mutation rate to oppo-
nent behavior. However, these strategies and mechanisms are devised for linear
utility functions with few negotiation issues. The performance of these methods
is uncertain when a large number of issues or complex utility functions are used.
This present work also employs genetic operators to obtain new offers, but it is
capable of providing solutions for domains with complex utility functions and
domains where the number of issues is large.
There have been some works that have studied the problem of negotiation
models for complex utility functions. Most of them have focused on mediated
negotiation models. The seminal work of Klein et al. [17] proposes a mediated
negotiation model where agents’ preferences are represented by influence matri-
ces. Influence matrices represent binary interdependence relationships between
binary issues. Their proposed approach consists of a mediator that generates
bids that are voted by the agents participanting in the protocol. Ito et al.
[13] propose a mediated negotiation model for multilateral negotiations where
agents have their preferences represented by weighted constraints. The agents
sample their utility function and carry out a simulated annealing for each point
sampled in order to obtain one’s own bids. If the utility of such point is above
a certain threshold, the constraints that the bid satisfies are sent to the media-
tor (constraint bid). After receiving bids from the agents, the mediator tries to
look for contracts common to the bids received, while maximizing social welfare.
Marsa-Maestre et al. [22, 23] carry out further research in the area of mediated
negotiation models for complex utility functions. More specifically, they take
advantage of the constraint based model by proposing different bidding mech-
anisms that work in the constraint space instead of the bid space. They also
allow for a negotiation protocol that may not be one-shot. In fact, the mediator
can suggest the relaxation of some constraint bids in order to increase the prob-
ability of finding an agreement. Nevertheless, all of these works need a trusted
mediator, which may not be available in every domain. Furthermore, their mod-
els are highly dependent on the underlying utility function. The present work
does not require a mediator and the model is independent of the underlying
utility function.
Robu et al. [33, 32] presented a non-mediated bilateral negotiation strategy
for agents in electronic commerce. Agent utility functions are based on special
graphical models called utility graphs. One of the agents, the seller, is responsi-
ble for finding agreements that are satisfactory for both parties. In order to do
that, the seller models the buyer by means of utility graphs and tries to learn the
buyer’s preferences. However, utility graphs are only designed for binary issues.
Our work differs in that it is capable of working with general complex utility
functions and is also capable of working issue domains that are not necessarily
binary.
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In Lai et al. [20], a powerful bilateral bargaining model with general utility
functions is presented. The negotiation protocol is based on the Rubinstein
alternating protocol [27], but each agent is allowed to send up to k different
offers in each round. The offer with highest utility is chosen from the k offers
received from the opponent in the last round. The offer from the current iso-
utility curve that is the most similar to the one chosen by the agent from the
offers made by the opponent is selected. This offer from the iso-utility curve
becomes a seed from which k-1 offers in the neighborhood are generated. The
selected offer from the curve and the k-1 generated offers are sent back to
the opponent. Again, the general ideal behind this heuristic is that, since the
offers are similar to one of the last offers received from the opponent, they are
more likely to be satisfactory for both parties. The model proposed in this
article complements the seminal work of Lai et al. since it adapts similarity
models for AmI environments. In the model proposed in this article, only a
small number of offers are sampled before the negotiation process, since it is
assumed that the utility function cannot be exhaustively explored. This is
especially important for scenarios with a large number of issues and scenarios
where devices have limited storage and computational resources. Secondly, the
proposed model incorporates an implicit learning mechanism that allows, thanks
to genetic operators, an intelligent sampling of new offers that may be of interest
for both parties.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Ambient Intelligence aims to offer new services and methods of interaction
with technology adapted to the users. It has been stated that automated ne-
gotiation may provide a conflict-resolution mechanism in Ambient Intelligence
applications where several users with opposing preferences need to cooperate
(e.g. ubiquitous shopping malls, fairs). In these environments, users’ agents
may present utility functions that are complex due to the interdependences
among the negotiation issues that form the utility function.
A multi-issue bilateral bargaining model for Ambient Intelligence domains
that deals with complex utility functions has been presented in this article.
This work complements the inspiring work of Lai et al. [20] and provides a
negotiation model that is adequate for Ambient Intelligence applications. The
main goal of this work is to achieve efficient agreements while maintaining the
use of computational resources low.
The proposed model uses a negotiation protocol where agents are allowed
to send up to k different offers in each negotiation round. Before the negotia-
tion process starts, each agent samples its own utility function by means of a
niching genetic algorithm. This genetic algorithm gets highly interesting and
significantly different offers for one’s own utility function (self-sampling). After
the negotiation process starts, the agents apply genetic operators over the last
offers received from the opponent and those offers that are most similar from
the current iso-utility curve (evolutionary sampling). The desired effect is to
sample new offers that are interesting for both parties. Therefore, the opponent
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preferences guide the sampling process during the negotiation process. The of-
fers that are sent to the opponent are selected from the current iso-utility curve,
being those that are the most similar to the last offers received from the oppo-
nent. An additional mechanism is introduced that allowing priority to be given
to those offers that come from the evolutionary sampling iso-utility curve.
Several experimental scenarios have been carried out and studied. In these
tests, the proposed model has been compared with a similarity heuristic that has
access to all of the possible offers and a similarity heuristic that samples the same
number of offers before the negotiation process by means of a niching genetic
algorithm (NES ). The results show that the proposed model needs very few
computational resources and storage to obtain statistically equivalent results to
the ideal case where all of the offers are available. For instance, the full iso-utility
curve consists of 106 offers and the proposed model just samples 1510 offers in
a negotiation setting where the number of issues is 6, and the number of offers
sent per negotiation round is 3. Additionally, although the proposed model and
the NES model sample the same number of offers, the first one obtains better
results. In fact, the NES model needs to sample 3.64 times more offers to obtain
similar results. The low computational cost and the efficient results make the
proposed model very adequate for Ambient Intelligence domains.
Future work includes studying the effect of changing preferences during the
negotiation process, (i.e., when the strategy is integrated with an argumentation
mechanism), and introducing different agent behaviors (more self-interested,
more cooperative, etc) by means of some modifications to genetic and selection
operators.
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